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GEORGE P. FLETCHER*
The ongoing debate about the rationale for punishing blackmail
assumes that there is something odd about the crime. Why, the
question goes, should demanding money to conceal embarrassing
information be criminalized when there is nothing wrong with the
separate acts of keeping silent or requesting payment for services
rendered? Why should an innocent end (silence) coupled with a
generally respectable means (monetary payment) constitute a crime?
This supposed paradox, however, is not peculiar to blackmail. Many
good acts are corrupted by doing them for a price. There is
nothing wrong with government officials showing kindness or doing
favors for their constituents, but doing them for a negotiated price
becomes bribery. Sex is often desirable and permissible by itself,
but if done in exchange for money, the act becomes prostitution.
Confessing to a crime may be praiseworthy in some circumstances,
but if the police pay the suspect to confess, the confession will
undoubtedly be labelled involuntary and inadmissible. If there is a
paradox in the crime of blackmail, these other practices of criminal
justice should also strike us as self-contradictory.
Contrary to the popular view in the literature, I wish to argue
that blackmail is not an anomalous crime but rather a paradigm for
understanding both criminal wrongdoing and punishment. That is
an ambitious claim, one that requires at least a clear plan of
exposition. My project is to seek "reflective equilibrium"1 across
ten cases that are pivotal in the debates about the rationale for
criminalizing blackmail. Reflective equilibrium requires a convinc-
ing fit between the agreed-upon outcomes in the ten cases and
general principles that can account for these outcomes. After
stating the cases and their legal resolutions, I will consider possible
explanatory principles. The desiderata that I set for a sound
analysis are not only that we explain the results but that we explain
* Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1 On the methodology of reflective equilibrium, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 48-51 (1971). Rawls explains the process of reflective equilibrium as follows:
"When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing account of [a problem]...
he may well revise his judgments to conform to its principles .... He is especially
likely to do this if he can find an explanation for the deviations which undermines his
confidence in his original judgments .... " Id. at 48.
(1617)
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why blackmail is criminal--not only in the United States but in all
civilized legal systems.
The latter requirement bears underscoring. It will not be
sufficient, for example, to explain blackmail's status as a crime
simply on the ground that it is immoral or that it leads to the
inefficient use of resources. Countless immoral and inefficient
activities are not punished.2  Affixing these labels to blackmail
could, at most, be a first step in explaining why it is a crime. The
inquiry would then focus on why the immorality or inefficiency
warrants punishment. As we shall see, explaining the simple
phenomenon of punishing blackmail requires an excursus into the
tangled web of theories justifying the entire institution of criminal
punishment. In order to account for blackmail as a crime, I offer
a novel retributive theory of punishment-a theory that, so far as I
know, has never before been articulated in the literature on
punishment. The task is complex but simple. Blackmail turns out
not to be a paradox but rather a paradigm for thinking anew about
the nature of crime and punishment.
I. TEN CASES
We begin, then, with standard cases that fall on both sides of the
line, some constituting blackmail, others, falling illuminatingly in
the category of lawful behavior.
1. Crime case: D threatens, if not paid, to report V's suspected
crime to the local prosecutor.
3
Blackmail
2. Tort case: V rams his car into D's. D threatens to sue if V does
not compensate D for the resulting damage.
4
No Crime
2 For example, negligently causing personal injury and property damage is
inefficient, but as a rule it is not subject to criminal punishment. See George Fletcher,
The Theoy of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401,402
(1971).
s See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962) (theft by extortion) ("A person is guilty
of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by threatening to ... (2) accuse
anyone of a criminal offense. .. ").
4 The Model Penal Code states:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraph[] (2)... that
the property obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other
invocation of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or
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3. Hush money: D threatens to reveal a damaging truth, say a sexual
peccadillo, about the celebrity V unless the latter pays "hush
money." The threat is supported by incriminating pictures.
5
Blackmail
4. Late employee: D, V's employer, threatens to fire Vifhe does not
get to work on time.
No Crime
5. Lascivious employer. D, V's employer, threatens to fire V unless
he sleeps with her.
6
Blackmail
6. Baseball case: D offers to sell V a baseball autographed by Babe
Ruth with knowledge that V's child, who is dying, would receive
solace from having the ball. D demands $6000 for the ball.
No Crime
7. Dinner kiss: D says to V "If you do not go to dinner with me, I
will not kiss you." Alternatively, D says to V: "If you do go to
dinner with me, I will kiss you."
No Crime
8. Tattoo case: D tells his friends that unless they pay him money,
he will have his entire body tattooed.
No Crime
9. Political embarrassment: V is a black political candidate. D is a
black activist with antiwhite views, whose connections to V are an
embarrassment to V. D goes to V and tells him that unless he is
paid off, he will speak out and repeatedly declare his support for
V, thereby sabotaging V's electoral chances.
Blackmail
indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to which such
accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, or a compensa-
tion for property or lawful services.
Id. This provision seems to suggest that there would no criminal blackmail even in
case 1, if the threat to complain to the local prosecutor was motivated by an "honest
claim" for "restitution or indemnification."
5 See id. ("A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another
by threatening to... (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred,
contempt or ridicule .. ").
6 Model Penal Code § 223.4 is limited to the acquisition of property. See id.
Nonetheless, extortion of the lascivious-employer variety is typically considered a form
of criminal blackmail. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
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10. Paid silence: Same story as in 9, but V goes to D and offers him
$20,000 to "lay low" until after the election.
7
No Crime
Of these ten cases, four represent clear instances of criminal
blackmail; six are related cases where the consensus appears to be
that the behavior is not subject to conviction either for blackmail or
for any another offense. Yet the cases are very closely related.
They all involve inducements by D, an offer of a benefit or the
threat of a harm, designed to bring about a certain form of behavior
in V. How should we go about distinguishing them? What
categories should we use for classifying them?
Taking these cases as our guide, we can quickly dispose of
several false leads. We will not take seriously, for example, the
conventional distinction between threatening to disclose informa-
tion (no. 3, hush money) and threatening other forms of harm, such
as dismissing an employee (no. 5, lascivious employer). A principled
distinction among the cases based on the mode of trying to get the
behavior one wants is hard to imagine. Nor should we put much
emphasis on whether the desired behavior consists in the surrender
of property (no. 3, hush money; no. 9, political embarrassment) or
sexual favors (no. 5, lascivious employer). Recognizing this distinc-
tion, as German law does,8 suggests that blackmail is a crime
against property-something like theft or acquiring property by false
pretenses. But that seems to place excessive emphasis on the
blackmailer's acquisitive end, with insufficient attention to the
means of realizing that end.
The striking feature of blackmail is the way the defendant seeks
to induce the behavior of another, not the peculiar interest that the
victim sacrifices. Even if we did distinguish between inducing
property transfers, on the one hand, and inducing other sorts of
behavior, on the other, all we would gain would be two versions of
LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 239 (1988) (proposing the exploitation principle as
a rationale for blackmail's criminalization).
7 Cases 9 and 10 are based on then-candidate David Dinkins's reportedly paying
$9500 to a controversial group headed by Sonny Carson. Roger Ailes, the
opposition's campaign manager, charged that the money was "a payoff for ...
keeping [Carson] quiet until after the election." Howard Kurtz, With Ailes's Aid,
Convict Becomes "Willie Horton" ofN.Y. Campaign, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1989, at A14.
I use this example in the text without implying that Roger Ailes was right or that
Mayor Dinkins did anything improper during his 1989 campaign.
8 See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] §§ 240 N6tingung (Coercion), 253 Erpressung
(Blackmail).
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blackmail running parallel to each other. Of course, the interest
sacrificed must be significant, however vague that threshold may be:
it is not enough that one is induced to go to dinner for fear of not
being kissed (no. 7, dinner kiss). We may concede that blackmail in
the narrow sense is limited to the acquisition of property; but
blackmail in the broad sense encompasses all actions aimed at
inducing the victim to give up something significant, something like
money, property, sexual favors, or political liberties. We shall be
concerned with blackmail in this broad sense.
II. THREATS AND OFFERS
It is tempting to stake out a path through the ten case results by
distinguishing between threats and offers. The argument is that in
the baseball case (no. 6) the refusal to sell at a lower price is not
blackmail because it represents the withholding of an offer, not the
making of a threat.9 Threats are coercive, but withholding offers
is not. Coercion is immoral because it deprives the victim of an
option that she would have had, and this deprivation interferes with
her autonomy, i.e., her freedom of action.
Yet not all threats, not all acts of coercion, are immoral or
criminal; for example, the threat to sue in the tort case (no. 2), is
considered permissible. So too the threat in the tattoo case (no. 8).
An all too facile resolution of these cases is that they contain threats
that D has the right to make. Joel Feinberg distinguishes these
cases from the criminality of threatening to lodge a criminal
complaint on the ground that one has a duty as well as a right to file
the complaint.10 There is no duty to sue in tort and no duty to
tattoo or abstain from tattooing oneself. It is unclear why it should
matter whether D is under a duty. True, Anglo-American contract
law addresses whether demanding payment for the performance of
a pre-existing duty constitutes valid consideration. But contract
doctrines have little to teach us about the nature of criminal
wrongdoing.
That the defendant's action constitutes a threat is clearly not a
sufficient condition for blackmail, though it might be a necessary
one. Accordingly, the distinction between threats and offers, if
9 Scott Altman, for example, relies heavily on this criterion in developing his
account of coercion and exploitation as the basic wrongs of blackmail. See Scott
Altman, A Patchwork Theoty of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640-45 (1993).
10 See FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 241.
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sound, could help us understand some of the cases. One could say,
for example, that the precise difference between the political
embarrassment case (no. 9) and the paid silence case (no. 10) is that
in the former D makes a threat, while in the latter V makes an offer.
Yet the distinction between offers and threats is not so easily drawn.
The two versions of the dinner kiss (no. 7) are functionally equiva-
lent. If you do not come, I do not kiss; if you do come, I do kiss.
It appears to be the same deal. Is the kiss an offer or the withhold-
ing of the kiss a threat? The classification does not depend on
whether it is good or bad to be kissed. If it is bad to be kissed, then
withholding becomes the offer, and puckering up, the threat.
To make the distinction between offers and threats, one must
first discern the normal state of affairs. If A kissing B is normal,
then withholding the kiss is a threat rather than an offer; if two
parties normally keep their distance, then the threat consists in
making contact. If we know the baseline of normalcy, we may
regard proposed changes for the worse as threats, and proposed
changes for the better as promises to confer benefits. The baseline
of normalcy is fairly obvious in the baseball case (no. 6), in which the
seller proposes to give the parent the benefit of the autographed
baseball, however outrageous the price. The baseline here is the
seller's ownership of the ball; the proposed benefit, the definitive
transfer of title and control. Because we are clear about the
baseline, we readily perceive the transfer of title as an act conferring
a benefit on the purchaser.
11
This, I take it, is the point of Nozick's distinction between
productive and nonproductive exchanges. 12 Selling the baseball
is clearly productive in the sense that both sides gain something by
the trade. In cases of blackmail, however, the exchange is not
productive for "if [nonproductive exchanges] were impossible or
forceably prohibited so that everyone knew they couldn't be done,
one of the parties to the potential exchange would be no worse
11 One can imagine a variation of the baseball case (no.6) in which setting the price
at $6000 constitutes a threat. Suppose that D sells sports memorabilia and the
normal asking price for the ball autographed by Babe Ruth is $600. If V has an
expectation and a right to buy at $600, then D's setting the price ten times higher
constitutes a threat to withhold the ball unless V pays the exploitative price. It is as
though D threatened to take the ball away from V if V did not pay an additional
$5400.
12 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-87 (1974) (defining a
productive activity as one that makes the purchaser better off than if the seller had
never existed, and an unproductive activity, like blackmail, as one that leaves the
purchaser no better off than she was before the sanction).
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off."13 In other words, in the paradigmatic hush money case (no.
3), the normal situation presumably is that the pictures and the
information remain suppressed. Relative to that baseline, V would
be no worse off if revealing the pictures were strictly enjoined. Of
course, if the normal situation is that the information leaks out,
then V is surely worse off if she is prohibited from paying hush
money. Whether the exchange is taken to be productive or
nonproductive depends on what we take to be the normal state of
affairs apart from the blackmailer's offer.
I am skeptical about whether a coherent account is available for
these parallel distinctions between threats and offers and between
nonproductive and productive exchanges. The basic idea is that
some things that we do to and for others increase their freedom
(their "opportunity set") and other actions decrease their freedom.
Whether A's acts increase or decrease B's freedom depends,
however, on what would happen if A were not present in B's life.
Yet the latter condition, "if A were not present," is insuperably
ambiguous. Does it mean that A does not have the information that
A could release to the press or does it mean that A does not ask for
payment to conceal the information? When the mugger A says to
B, "Your money or your life," the same ambiguity is inescapable. If
A never confronts B with a gun, B is of course better off, but if A
does point a gun at B, B is also better off if she has the option of
paying in order to avoid getting shot. In one sense the exchange is
unproductive (as compared with A's never pointing the gun at B),
but in another sense, it is productive (as compared with A's
shooting B). The familiar problem of time-frame ambiguity-narrow
or broad?-makes it virtually impossible to decide whether these
transactions decrease or increase freedom.
III. THIRD-PARTY CHIPS
If the distinction between threats and offers is not likely to get
us very far, maybe James Lindgren's effort to unravel the "paradox
of blackmail" 14 hits closer to the mark. His comprehensive study
reviews the literature, pans all competing theories, and then offers
a test for distinguishing between blackmail and permissible
commerce. The wrong, says Lindgren, is that the blackmailer seeks
13 Id. at 85.
14 SeeJames Lindgren, Unraveling The Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670
(1984).
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to bargain with something that does not belong to him or her: "In
effect, the blackmailer attempts to gain an advantage in return for
suppressing someone else's actual or potential interest. The
blackmailer is negotiating for his own gain with someone else's
leverage or bargaining chips."
15
With this criterion in hand, Lindgren rolls through the cases.
The crime case (no. 1) is blackmail because D is "bargaining with the
state's chip."1 6 The hush money case (no. 3) falls into the same
category because D tries to sell the public's right to know the
content of the pictures. Because V pays "to avoid being harmed by
persons other than the blackmailer,"'17 D supposedly engages in an act
that is criminally wrong. The lascivious employer case (no. 5) is not
so easy to explain on Lindgren's theory, but I suppose he might
argue that by misusing her authority (threatening to dismiss an
employee for reasons unrelated to job performance), the employer
is bargaining with chips that belong to her partners, clients, or
stockholders. With similar imagination, one can dispose of the
political embarrassment case (no. 9): D seeks gain by invoking the
interests of the electorate or at least those of the competing political
party.
There is no theoretical harm in this imaginative play about
whose chips are really at stake in an alleged blackmail transaction.
It hints at the difference, for example, between threatening to sue
after an accident (okay) and threatening to file a criminal complaint
(not okay), or between threatening to dismiss V if he does not get
to work on time (okay) and threatening to fire him if he refuses
sexual favors (not okay). Yet the argument does not go far enough.
It fails to account for the difference between the political embarrass-
ment and paid silence cases (nos. 9 & 10). In the intuitive response
of most people, it makes a difference whether the candidate V is
subject to the threat of political embarrassment, or whether he takes
the initiative to keep the source of embarrassment out of harm's
way. He is not the victim of blackmail if he initiates the transaction.
In either case, however, D plays with a chip that seems to belong to
someone else. Lindgren's analysis focuses entirely on the content
of the transaction, and fails to consider who initiates the interaction
or whether the transaction lends itself to repetition. As we shall
1' Id. at 702.
16 Id.
17 Id.
BLACKMAIL: THE PARADIGMATIC CRIME
see, the latter factor turns out to be critical in developing a proper
understanding of blackmail.
Lindgren's criterion-emphasizing the unfair trafficking in other
people's chips-calls into question our assumed distinction between
selling the baseball at an outrageous price and the other stipulated
cases of blackmail. In the baseball case (no. 6), the seller takes
advantage of the sick child's vulnerable condition and her special
love for Babe Ruth. The baseball might be worth no more than
$600 on the collectors' market, but under these circumstances, the
seller reaps an unexpected profit. She drives a hard, exploitative
bargain, but one that is neither criminal blackmail nor any other
form of crime. The windfall profits derive from her taking
advantage of something that does not belong to her, namely, the
child's and parent's consumer surplus in possessing the ball. She is
bargaining with a chip that does not belong to her, and for
Lindgren, that should be enough to render her demand criminal.
Since by common agreement it is not criminal, there must be
something awry in Lindgren's argument.
One might object that I am playing fast and loose with the
notion of chips and the people to whom they belong. Perhaps, but
so does Lindgren. After all, how does one know whose chips are at
stake in the lascivious employer and political embarrassment cases (nos.
5 & 9), when one party makes an unfair threat against another?
Lindgren's implicit theory of bargaining chips seem to turn on a
notion of extra-legal moral rights. Some people other than the
potential blackmailer have a morally defensible interest in the item
being sold-whether the item is pictures in the hush money case (no.
3), a job in the lascivious employer case (no. 5), or an improved
chance of winning the election in the political embarrassment case
(no. 9). Even if we could solve these problems, it is not clear what
should follow. Lindgren's claim about playing with other people's
chips trades on a general principle of fairness: play only with your
own chips and do not cheat. This may be a sound moral principle,
but cheating and sharp dealing are, at most, tangential concerns in
the criminal law. We do not penalize cheating on exams, commit-
ting adultery with other people's wives or husbands, or even stealing
numerous forms of intellectual property protected under tort law.
By like token, there is no reason to punish the particular form of
cheating that Lindgren espies in cases of blackmail.
We are left with the problem posed at the outset: How do we
generate a principle to cover these ten cases that, at the same time,
connects with general criteria of crime and punishment? None of
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the tests and criteria proposed in the literature are capable of
satisfying these desiderata. We must make a clean break with the
conventional approaches to the problem. The break consists in
broadening our focus from the intrinsic nature of the transaction to
the kind of relationship that the transaction engenders between the
parties. We must look at the aftermath of the suspected blackmail
to determine whether the act is criminal or not. First, I will
illustrate how this approach accounts for the ten cases; then
broaden the thesis to suggest a general approach to crime and
punishment; finally, I consider several objections to the thesis.
IV. DOMINANCE AND SUBORDINATION
The proper test, I submit, is whether the transaction with the
suspected blackmailer generates a relationship of dominance and
subordination. If V's paying money or rendering a service to D
creates a situation in which D can or does dominate V, then the
action crosses the line from permissible commerce to criminal
wrongdoing. The essence of D's dominance over V is the prospect
of repeated demands. Consider the difference between the crime
and tort cases (nos. 1 & 2). In one case D threatens criminal
prosecution; in the other, a private law suit. The critical point here
is that if V pays D an amount necessary to settle the tort dispute
between them, D must release his claim. He cannot thereafter come
back to V and demand more. But if V pays D money to suppress a
criminal investigation, D retains the option of coming back for
more. It turns out, therefore, that these first two cases neatly
illustrate the thesis. Blackmail occurs when, by virtue of the
demand and the action satisfying the demands, the blackmailer
knows that she can repeat the demand in the future. Living with
that knowledge puts the victim of blackmail in a permanently
subordinate position.
Let us see whether the same test provides a guide to the other
eight cases. The recurrent hush money case (no. 3) is readily
resolved. If V pays D to keep the information to himself, the latter
has every incentive to demand more money in the future. V places
his life and fortune at the disposal of the blackmailer. Even if D
says that she is surrendering the pictures and the negatives, there is
no assurance that copies have not been made. Nor is there any way
to expunge D's personal knowledge of the pictures and what they
reveal. Scott Altman makes the same point after he fails to find an
adequate explanation of why selling an embarrassing video at the
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market price to the victim should be punishable.1 8 The case
puzzles him because demanding only that the victim pay the price
that a television station would have paid for the video insulates the
transaction from the stigma of exploitation. Yet, he concedes,
"there cannot be any guarantee that a first payment will not be
followed by more demands." 19 And the maker of the video, even
should she surrender all copies, "might later demand further
payment not to tell people what she saw." 20 This is the essence of
the blackmail-not the transaction itself, but the relationship of
dominance implicit in taking the first step of inducing the victim to
pay money for her own protection.
The late employee case (no. 4) illustrates the converse thesis that
unless further threats are imminent in the transaction, there is no
criminal blackmail. So long as V shows up on time, D can make no
additional threat of dismissal. This case thus falls into the pattern
of the tort case (no. 2). But, if in the following case (no. 5), V sleeps
with D, he places himself in her power. The initial submission
establishes a relationship of dominance and subordination that
encourages further sexual demands. The thesis is clearly borne out
by these two cases.
And what about the troublesome baseball case (no. 6)? The
theory proves its mettle in neatly accounting for why a tough one-
shot transaction cannot be considered criminal blackmail. Once the
parent purchases the baseball, the seller D can demand nothing
further. In no sense does the parent place herself in ongoing
subordination to the seller, and there is thus no criminal wrong in
demanding an exorbitant price for the baseball. This strikes me as
a far more persuasive account of this case than one that focuses on
the supposed distinction between offers and threats. Significantly,
no analysis of "baselines" or "normalcy" is necessary to dismiss this
case as exploitative commerce rather than criminal blackmail.
Neither variation of the dinner kiss case (no. 7) poses a problem
of dominance and subordination. The threat and the demand are
minimal. V can easily tell D to "take a walk" and be free of the
minimal threat. Dominance requires something more than
withholding a kiss or making unwanted bodily contact. Exactly what
is required, however, is not clear. The message of the tattoo case
(no. 8) is that no one can dominate someone else by asking for
18 See Altman, supra note 9, at 1648.
19 See id.
20 Id. at n.34.
1993] 1627
1628 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1617
money to do or not to do that which is in one's recognized domain
of freedom. The case resembles the problem of the landowner who
threatens to build a wall on his own property that will deprive his
neighbor of light. The neighbor has no easement to interpose
against the landowner, and if the latter thus demands payment to
forgo building the wall, the demand is within the landowner's rights;
there is no blackmail in demanding payments to do or not to do
that which one has a right to do. For the neighbor to complain of
subordination to the whims of the wall-builder, he would have to
have some legitimate interest that is put in jeopardy by the repeated
demands for payment.
The great virtue of the dominance-and-subordination test is that
it neatly accounts for the distinction between the political embarrass-
ment and paid silence cases (nos. 9 & 10). Indeed, the test grows out
of my effort to make sense of this distinction. Think of these two
cases as posing variations on the interaction between the candidate
and the activist who has the power to embarrass him. If the
candidate submits to the activist's demand (no. 9) and pays him to
keep quiet, the candidate comes under the sway of the activist who,
like other blackmailers, would continue to make demands. On the
other hand, if the candidate takes the initiative, seeks out the
activist, and offers him "walk-around money" to stay out of sight
until after the election (no. 10), the candidate is the master of the
transaction. He certainly is not being blackmailed, and neither is
the activist, who is simply being paid a salary for remaining quiet for
a certain period of time. If our fictional candidate is smart, he will
structure the payment in the paid silence case in staggered install-
ments so that the activist has an incentive to keep his side of the
bargain. Of course, the latter might realize that more money is to
be had by selling his silence. If he starts threatening the candidate
that he will speak if he does not receive more, however, the
situation reverts to the pattern of the political embarrassment case
(no. 9).
We have now generated a coherent and convincing fit between
the principle of dominance and these specific cases. Unless some
counterexample might challenge the principle, we should move to
the next stage of the two-part test for what constitutes a convincing
account of blackmail. Does the principle of dominance explain not
only why blackmail is undesirable but also why it is conventionally
regarded as a crime subject to punishment? The question invites us
to consider whether punishment fulfills an important function in
counteracting relationships of dominance. This inquiry, in turn,
BLACKMAIL: THE PARADIGMATIC CRIME
necessitates a slight detour to survey the theoretical positions
typically considered in the literature on punishment.
V. PUNISHMENT AS THE NEGATION OF DOMINANCE
Punishment is one of those topics on which consensus eludes us.
Since the eighteenth century, utilitarians and Kantians have been
arguing about whether punishment is justified by the good it brings
about or simply as an imperative of justice, regardless of its social
costs and benefits. In the works of Beccaria 21 and Bentham,22 we
encounter the systematic utilitarian argument that the deterrent
value of the penalty must outweigh the suffering of the prisoner.
The welfare represented by a safer society justifies the pain inflicted
on the offender.
Referring to this approach as the "principle of happiness" or
"eudaemonism," 23 Immanuel Kant found a loophole in the utilitar-
ian argument. Justifying punishment by appealing to its beneficial
consequences could readily justify differential punishment for the
same crime-depending on the social needs of the moment. Kant
dismissed this potential result of utilitarianism with outrage: "The
principle of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him
who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to
discover something that releases the criminal from punish-
ment. ... 24 Kant insisted that punishment is an imperative of
both morality and justice. And "if justice goes, there is no longer
any value in men living on the earth."
25
The opposition between Bentham and Kant provides the
framework for most contemporary debates about punishment. For
Benthamite utilitarians, the primary justification for punishment is
deterrence; for Kantians, it is the retributive justice implicit in
making the punishment fit the crime. Retribution seeks retrospec-
tive justice: it looks only to the crime, and not to the beneficial
consequences of punishment. On this axis of time, utilitarianism is
prospective: it looks to the beneficial consequences of punishment
21 See CESARE B. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 17-19 (David Young
trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1986) (1764).22 SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 165-74 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
23 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 183 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1991) (1797).
24 Id. at 141.
25 Id.
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rather than to any imperatives urged by the facts. There are, we
should note, many variations on the axis of retrospective and
prospective or consequential theories. Let us distinguish among
some of them:
1. Purely retrospective: The only permissible punishments are those
based on events in the past, and particularly on the details of the
crime.
2. Factually consequential: Punishment is justified by deterrence,
both special (the criminal himself) and general (the rest of
society). This argument represents a factual prediction; if neither
the criminal nor the rest of society is deterred, then the prediction
is false. Whether punishment is justified on these grounds,
therefore, requires careful observation of what happens in the
aftermath of punishing. In testing a penalty's efficacy, the
problem is distinguishing between those things that would have
happened anyway from consequences solely attributable to the act
of punishment.
3. Conceptually consequential: Some of the consequences by which
punishment is justified are conceptually linked to the act of
punishing; the desirable consequences follow logically from the
punishment. For example, Hegel's argument for punishment is
that it vindicates the Right over the Wrong represented by the
crime.26 This act of vindication is conceptually connected to the
punishment in the sense that if one is convinced the vindication
occurs, no facts can undermine this conviction.
4. Mixed theories: To avoid the conflict among these variations,
many theorists today argue that punishment must satisfy both of
these desiderata. It must have a deterrent effect and it cannot
exceed the punishment that the defendant deserves for the deed,
considered purely retrospectively.
As we shall see, the argument that punishment counteracts
criminal dominance-the rationale that I have proposed for
punishing blackmail-lies somewhere between the poles of factual
and conceptual consequentialism. The claim is that punishing
criminals restores the dignity of the victim. Whether this is a
factual or conceptual consequence remains to be seen.
The debate about the rationale for punishment has appeared to
be endless because none of the proffered positions escapes telling
criticism. Utilitarians suffer the charge of not taking human
autonomy and responsibility seriously; i.e., they treat criminals as
26 
See GEORG W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 99 (T.M. Knox trans.,
Oxford University Press 1952) (1821).
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organisms to be manipulated rather than as human ends in
themselves. Yet retributivists do not agree on why it is right to
punish somebody, whether a new social benefit follows or not. The
best way to appreciate the defects in the standard retributive
argument is to consider the many unconvincing arguments Kant
offers for his position. After surveying these diverse approaches, I
will seek to defend my own thesis-that criminal punishment negates
the blackmailer's dominance-by invoking the least popular passage
in Kant's defense of punishment. This passage calls for the
execution of the last murderer languishing in prison before society
voluntarily disbands.
2 7
Most of Kant's arguments in favor of retributive punishment
turn on the themes of equality and universality. First, in the context
of the "woe to him . . ." passage quoted above,28 Kant develops a
general critique of the inequalities engendered by a case-specific
calculation of the social advantages and disadvantages of punishing
a particular person. Kant believed, above all, that punishment
required the equal application of the law. There should be no
exceptions, not even for those whose punishment benefits soci-
ety.29 The term "categorical imperative" that Kant casually invokes
is not, in this passage, used in its ordinary sense.30 It means no
more here, it seems, than a commitment to general and universal
laws, equally applied.
In his second argument in favor of nonutilitarian punishment,
Kant stresses the equality or equivalence between the crime and the
punishment. Drawing on the teachings of the ius talionis, he insists
that the scales of justice as well as the concept of law itself require
this equivalence." No other standard would, he claims, be suffi-
ciently precise to meet the good identified as "strict justice" under
law.
3 2
The third argument elicits Kant's understanding of "retribution"
as captured in the German term Vergeltung. The categorical
imperative in its ordinary sense requires people to act on their
maxims (subjective plans) only if these maxims can be universalized
27 See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.
28 See supra text accompanying note 24.
29 For example, one could benefit society by voluntarily submitting to medical
experiments. See id. at 141.
So See infra text accompanying note 33.
31 See KANT, supra note 23, at 141.
32 See id.
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and made to apply (gelten) as a universal law.33 If one applies a
negative version of the categorical imperative that Kant, trading on
the association with gelten, calls vergelten, the same should be true of
criminals. The justification for punishment, as it emerges in this
argument, requires that the criminal's maxim be universalized and
applied to him.3 4 If he kills, his killing should be universalized
and applied to him. If he steals, his stealing should be regarded as
a universal law, which would imply that all property would be
subject to theft. If property is undermined, then the criminal
should be treated as not having any resources of his own. If he has
no resources, Kant concludes (playfully, it would seem) that he
should be imprisoned, and forced to work for his sustenance.
3 5
Though this argument blurs the distinction between the
poorhouse and the prison, one should recall that, at the time of
Kant's writing in 1795, imprisonment had yet to become the
common mode of punishment. Kant struggles to find a rationale
for putting people behind bars rather than executing, exiling, or
castrating them. The latter forms of punishment he regards as
fitting, respectively, for murder and treason,
36 sex with animals, 37
and rape.3 8 The general theme in Kant's writing on punishment
is that the crime should be turned back on the criminal. Sometimes
this can be done by universalizing the criminal's maxim and making
him suffer the consequences, or by making the punishment "fit" the
crime, just as castration fits rape. The notion of a fitting punish-
ment bears some resemblance to Michel Foucault's thesis that
punishment was originally thought to expiate the crime by reenact-
ing the horror of the crime on the body of the defendant.
39
The most intriguing of Kant's arguments for retributive
punishment is the most often derided. He imagines that a society
is about to disband, but it has a problem: murderers, condemned
to die, still languish in prison. What should be done about them?
Kant insists that the murderers should be executed "so that each has
33 See id. at 51.
4 For the background to this analysis in Kant's legal and moral theory, see
generally George Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 533 (1987).
35 See KANT, supra note 23, at 142.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 169.
38 See id.
39 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 3-16
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
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done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling
to the people." 40 Executing them seems to be pointless because
no societal benefit could possibly follow. But this is precisely Kant's
point.
The notion of a society's disbanding should be treated as a
thought-experiment, very much like the idea of a society's coming
together in a social contract. Neither of these events ever occurred
in history, but they are useful constructs for testing our intuitions
about the conditions of a just social order. -Further, the biblical
reference to blood guilt is highly suggestive. In biblical culture, a
murderer acquired control over the victim's blood; the killer had to
be executed in order to release the victim's blood, permitting it to
return to God as in the case of a natural death.41 The failure to
execute the murderer meant that the rest of society, charged with
this function, became responsible for preventing the release of the
victim's blood.
Whatever the metaphysics of gaining and releasing control of
blood, the biblical idea should be understood today as a metaphor
for society's complicity in a crime for failing to punish the criminal.
Once the institution of punishment becomes the conventional
response to an obvious crime, the decision either to prosecute or
not to prosecute carries social meaning. The state's intervention
communicates condemnation of the crime and solidarity with the
victim. By prosecuting, the state's officials say to the victim and his
or her family: "You are not alone. We stand with you, against the
criminal."
Conversely, refusing to prosecute and convict for an obvious
crime also carries meaning. When the state courtjury acquitted the
four officers charged with beating Rodney King,42 they communi-
cated implicit approval of the police behavior, thus engendering
rage among African-Americans in Los Angeles. 43 The existence of
4o KANT, supra note 23, at 142.
41 See DAVID DAUBE, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAw 122-24 (1947) (noting how, in
ancient times, the victor in a battle drank the blood of the vanquished).42 See Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 Acquitted in King Beating:
Violence Follows Verdicts; Guard Called Out, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al.
43 As a technical matter, of course, the jury in the Rodney King case only
concluded that they had a reasonable doubt about whether the four indicted officers
used excessive force. I am speaking here of the popular understanding of the verdict,
not its technical meaning. For more on this point, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME
OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 199-217 (1988)
(analyzing how many unfortunately interpreted the Goetz verdict in racial, rather than
legal, terms).
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the institution of punishment creates an opportunity to counteract
the criminal's attainment of an unjust position of power over others.
The failure of police, prosecutors, and juries to invoke their
established power, their inaction when there is an opportunity to
act, provides the foundation for the perception of shared responsi-
bility. If they willfully refuse to invoke the traditional response to
crime, they effectively disassociate themselves from the victim.
Abandoned, both the victim and the victim's community feel
betrayed by the system.
Punishment expresses solidarity with the victim and seeks to
restore the relationship of equality that antedated the crime. This
may not be so obvious in a culture that has become accustomed to
thinking of punishment as a utilitarian instrument of crime control.
To appreciate the psychological significance of the state's standing
by the victim, consider the cases in which the state refuses to
prosecute and thereby abandons the victim to solitary suffering. For
example, during the terror in Argentina that led to approximately
9000 desaparecidos in the early 1980s, many victims' families realized,
to their horror, that they could not turn to the police. The police
were often the ones engaged in the round-up of suspected terrorists.
The failure of the state to come to the aid of victims, as
expressed in a refusal to invoke the customary institutions of arrest,
prosecution, and punishment, generates moral complicity in the
aftermath of the crime. The state's failure to punish also reaffirms
the relationship of dominance over the victim that the criminal has
already established.
This argument for punishment admittedly relies on a double-
negative. It is less an argument for punishment, in fact, than an
argument about why not punishing is sometimes tantamount to
complicity in evil. And it is not an argument for punishment ab
initio. Some other argument is necessary to explain why it is better
for the state to punish than to impose civil penalties or simply to
have its officials declare that they sympathize with the victim.
Generating a positive argument for punishment requires that we
return to the theme of domination as I advanced it in the context
of blackmail. 44 Extending the thesis to all crimes of violence and
even to theft and embezzlement is not a difficult task. The
argument is that all of these crimes carry in their train a relation-
ship of dominance and subordination. Rape victims have good
44 See supra part IV.
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reason to fear that the rapist will return, particularly if the rape
occurred at home or the rapist otherwise knows the victim's
address. Burglars and robbers pose the same threat. Becoming a
victim of violence beyond the law means that what we all fear
becomes a personal reality; exposure and vulnerability take hold and
they continue until the offender is apprehended. It would be
difficult to maintain that all crimes are characterized by this feature
of dominance. We can say, however, that this relationship of power
lies at the core of the criminal law. It is characteristic of the system
as a whole.
In order to counteract the power of the criminal over the victim,
the state must intervene by exercising power over the criminal. It
is not enough to make the offender pay damages or a fine, for all
this means is that she purchases her ongoing status exempt from the
prohibitions that apply to others. The state must dominate the
criminal's freedom, lest the criminal continue her domination of the
victim. The deprivation of liberty and the stigmatization of the
offense and the offender-these means counteract the criminal's
dominance by reducing his capacity to exercise power over others
and symbolically lowering his status.
VI. ONE, TWO, MANY OBJECTIONS
Any novel way of thinking about crime and punishment is likely
to engender skepticism, and this is undoubtedly the case both with
this account of blackmail as a paradigmatic crime and with my
theory of punishment. Let me try here to anticipate and respond
to probable objections.
Some may argue that not all crime generates a relationship of
dominance. This is obviously true, and I could not possibly insist
that every case conforms to the thesis. The most that I need to
show, however, is that the core of the criminal law is expressed in
an act of achieving dominance over others. If the thesis is persua-
sive, it provokes questions about nonconforming cases, such as
homicide.
45
Others may posit a much more serious objection, arguing that
it is unclear how punishment counteracts the criminal's dominance
over the victim. This objection challenges the notion that the
45 Homicide seems to be a special case. We could treat the decedent's loved ones
as secondary victims, but they do not suffer from the same fear of recurrence that
characterizes other forms of violent crime.
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consequence of punishment is conceptually connected to the act of
punishment, that punishment negates the criminal's wrong and
vindicates the right.4 6 There should be some data, some factual
consequence, that determines whether this objection is correct or
incorrect. It might even be correct under some circumstances but
not others. The data that would validate the claim would be the
experience of victims, their testimony that apprehending, prosecut-
ing, and punishing those who prey on them enables them to
reintegrate into society and overcome their humiliation.
The testimony that one can come by is largely anecdotal. And
it is easier to find stories that support the negative proposition that
not punishing those who have committed crimes demoralizes victims
and requires them to live under inhumane psychological stress. I
was led to this thesis, in part, by a story that I have never been able
to verify in the press. Upon President Raiil Alfonsin's replacing the
military junta in Argentina, the father of an abducted child-a
desaparecido-expected the newly elected government to take rapid
action against criminal elements in the military. Nothing happened
for several months. As a result, the father despaired and eventually
committed suicide. In this particular case, of course, there may
have been psychological factors that pushed the father over the
edge. But I still understand and empathize with his distress, and
that of a man I interviewed shortly after the verdict in the Goetz
case. He called into a talk show and reported:
I'm a New Yorker, black. Over the past seven years, three
members, boys, in my family has [sic] been killed, the last one
shot, with the killer that we see weekly-today-walking around.
My wife has been mentally disturbed ever since this happened
because no one is serving time for any of this .... The question
is: where is the justice?
47
The caller sympathized with Goetz. If the system does not respond
to the plight of victims, they invariably fantasize that a vigilante will
vindicate their dignity.
A third objection, raised by Stephen Latham at the Blackmail
Symposium, is whether one can give a persuasive account of
blackmail merely by focusing on the relationship of dominance
induced by the interaction between the parties. The dominance
might bejustified. Determining whether it is requires consideration
46 See HEGEL, supra note 26, § 99.
47 See FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 199-200.
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of the intrinsic merits of the act itself, not just its aftermath. The
legal system is arguably a system ofjustified dominance. It must be
the case, therefore, that the blackmailer's actions are somehow
intrinsically wrong and unjustified.
Many words and expressions at hand express what is wrong with
blackmail. In fact, too many things are wrong with it. Blackmail
represents coercion of the victim, 48 exploitation of the victim's
weakness, 49 and trading unfairly in assets or chips that belong to
others. 50 It represents an undesirable and abusive form of private
law enforcement. 51 It leads to the waste of resources so far as
blackmailers are induced to collect information that they are willing
to suppress for a fee.52 None of these arguments, however, offers
a convincing account of the difference between cases of punishable
and nonpunishable conduct. All of them capture a portion of
blackmail's evil, but none accounts systematically for the cases.
Of all the arguments about the wrong immanent in blackmail,
only one accounts persuasively for the distinctions implicit in the
ten cases considered above, and that is the impact of the alleged
blackmail on the ensuing relationship between D and V. When D's
demand is a one-shot affair, as when D threatens to sue in tort if V
does not agree to the payment demanded, there is no crime. There
is no way to explain this or the other cases of nonpunishable threats
except to note that V's payment effects a settlement and thus
negates the possibility of repeated demands. Conversely, all the
cases of punishable blackmail generate a situation that invites
repeated threats and exploitation.
Finally, some may argue that if the aftermath of the alleged
blackmail is the determinative factor, why not define the crime as
the second act of blackmail? Douglas Ginsburg and Larry Alexander
raised this objection at the Blackmail Symposium, and though I was
initially puzzled by it, I see now that it poses no serious challenge to
my thesis. Ginsburg and Alexander obviously understood domi-
nance as a state of affairs that crystallizes only as a result of
repeated demands. Therefore, one must wait for the second
demand to ascertain whether the blackmailer intends to exercise his
48 See Altman, supra note 9, at 1641-43.
49 See id. at 1644-45.
5o See Lindgren, supra note 14, at 70
51 See Richard A. Posner, Blackmai4 Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1817, 1823-26 (1993).
52 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmaik An Economic Analysis
of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1859-65 (1993).
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power. But, in fact, the relationship of dominance and subordina-
tion comes into being as a result of the victim's making the first
payment or engaging in the first coerced act of submission. The
dominance consists in the knowledge that the victim is now fair
game for repeated demands. Dominance and subordination are
states of anticipation. When both parties know that the victim has
submitted once and has no defense against submitting again, he is
at the mercy of the blackmailer. His only hope lies in the interven-
tion of the police or other agents of the criminal law.
The existence of criminal sanctions gives him the possibility of
asserting a counter-threat of going to the police. Some might object
to the permissibility of reciprocal blackmail, for threatening
prosecution, considered by itself, violates the same criminal
prohibition. Yet as a defensive move, as a way of protecting oneself
from blackmail, the counter-threat of invoking the criminal law
seems fully justified.
